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Article 13

Reassessing Attorney-Client Privileged Legal Advice
in Patent Litigation
The Federal Circuit on the Federal Circuit:
"[The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] is charged with
the duty of increasing doctfinal stability in the field of patent
law."'

-

The United States Supreme Court on privilege:
"An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain
but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little
better than no privilege at all."'

I. INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege, the oldest of the so-called "communication" privileges, exists to protect the confidential communications shared between a client and his legal advisor. The prevailing application of the privilege, however, undermines this purpose
by operating in a. one-directional manner, protecting only the
statements of the client to the attorney and those of the attorney
which would directly reveal the already privileged statements of
the client 8 The effects of such an application are particularly felt
in patent litigation where a great deal of advisory documents are
at stake.4 The most dramatic repercussion of this one-directional
approach is its inconsistent application, which has led to a great

1 Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 333 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See
generally S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 12-17.
2 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1980).
3 In such a one-directional application, the privilege would protect a letter from
the client to his attorney requesting advice, and the attorney's reply. However, this application would not provide protection to unsolicited legal advice from an attorney to his
client under the rationale that such a communication reveals no prior communication
from the client.
4 Gerald Sobel, The Confidential Communication Element of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 4
CARDOZO L. REv. 649, 660 (1983) ("In major cases, hundreds of thousands of documents
must often be examined for production purposes as well as for evidence."); see also
Chubb Integrated Sys. v. National Bank, 103 F.RtD. 52, 66 (D.D.C. 1984).
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deal of confusion surrounding the privilege and its proper scope
in patent scenarios. By returning to a bi-directional application of
the attorney-client privilege, one which would protect both statements of the client to the attorney and those of the attorney to
the client, not only will the true spirit behind the privilege be
realized, but greater efficiency and consistency in pre-trial patent
litigation will result.
This Note, therefore, endorses such a bi-directional approach
through a multi-step analysis of the privilege and its application to
patent litigation. Part II surveys the history and purpose of the
privilege, presenting the two prevailing standards currently used in
federal courts.' Part III reviews the privilege's tumultuous historical application in the field of patent law and highlights three common areas of confusion: (1) patent law as the practice of law, (2)
the patent attorney's duty of candor to the Patent and Trademark
Office, and (3) the misdirected focus on the information behind
the communication. Part IV argues for a bi-directional approach to
the attorney-client privilege through a detailed examination and
comparison of the original intent behind the two privilege standards. Part V analyzes the relationship of the Federal Circuit to
the field of patent law and its most recent decision relating to this
issue. Part VI proffers a means by which the Federal Circuit could
adopt the bi-directional application of the attorney-client privilege
to legal advice in patent litigation. Lfstly, Part VII discusses the
merit of the application of such a bi-directional privilege in patent
litigation and concludes that the attorney-client privilege's protection should encompass legal advisory correspondence from the
patent attorney to the client.
II.

THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: AN OVERVIEW

In order to effectively analyze the merit and proper scope of
the attorney-client privilege, a review of the history and purpose
behind the privilege is necessary. Once that background and rationale is examined, a explanation of the two standards the circuits
use at present will provide a foundation with which to examine
the application of the attorney-client privilege in specific patentbased scenarios.

5 Original subject matter jurisdiction over all patent claims is vested in the federal
judiciary. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
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A. History and Purpose of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The concept of privilege is a cornerstone of our legal system.
However, by restricting full disclosure, the privilege conflicts with
one of the major purposes of modem discovery.6 The justification behind the existence of any privilege is based upon social
policy considerations: a balance must be struck between encouraging confidence in certain relationships and allowing full access
to specific information for litigation purposes.7 Certain relationships are deemed valuable enough to merit the exclusion of the
communications of that relationship from discovery under the
category of communication privileges.' The oldest of these communication privileges is the attorney-client privilege, dating back to
the reign of Elizabeth IV
Yet, while the attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the
common law privileges for confidential communications, the rationale supporting it was entirely different during its first 300 years
of existence."0 Originally, the privilege was more concerned with
the oath and honor of the attorney himself, rather than with the
special relationship between the attorney and client." However,
toward the end of the eighteenth century, this objective rationale
lost ground to a more subjective one. Courts recognized that "the
judicial search for the truth could not endure to be obstructed by
a voluntary pledge of secrecy, nor was there any moral delinquency or public odium in breaking one's pledge under the force of

6 The three major purposes behind modem discovery are: (1) to preserve relevant
information that might not be available at trial, (2) to ascertain the issues that actually
are in controversy between the parties, and (3) to allow a party to obtain information
that will lead to admissible evidence on the issues in dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 27,
32-34; see also JAMES H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.1 (1985). The concept
of privilege conflicts with the third of these purposes, since it precludes a party from
obtaining certain information.
Under these Federal Rules, the scope of discovery is extremely broad, subject to
"privilege" as mentioned in Rule 26(b)(1), which under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence refers to the common law definition of such. FED. R. EVID. 501.
7 FRIEDENTHAL Er AL, supra note 6, § 7.4.
8 Id. § 10.2.
9 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRILS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Other notable communication privileged relationships involve doctors and patients, mental health practitioners and patients, religious leaders and
parishioners, and husbands and wives. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL, supra note 6, § 10.2.
10

8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 543-45.

11

8 id.
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the law." 2 The British Dutchess of Kingston's Case" finally put
the "honor pledge" rationale to rest and began the era of the
current rationale behind the notion of the attorney-client privilege.
Today, a more utilitarian justification is put forth to support
the maintenance of an attorney-client privilege." This Well established purpose behind the privilege is simply stated as the promotion of full and open communication between the attorney and
client."t By protecting confidential attorney-client communications, courts foster the viewpoint that society values the attorneyclient relationship and, thus, the relationship should be encour6
aged.
Hence, the attorney-client privilege advances the public interest in two ways. First, it encourages full and frank dialogue between attorneys and clients, which undoubtedly leads to better
legal representation. Second, by allowing this open discussion,
the privilege promotes the broader public interests of encouraging
8
the observation of law and the administration of justice."
This subjective rationale, however, requires some form of
analysis with which to ascertain the applicability of the privilege.
As with many areas of the law, more than one standard developed.
From these developments, the different circuits have settled on
one of two standards for the attorney.:client privilege, opting for

12 8 id. at 543.
13 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (1776), reprinted in NOTABLE BRMSH TRIALS SERIES 256 (Melville ed. 1927). In this House of Lords trial for bigamy, Lord Barrington attempted to invoke his honor to avoid testifying against his friend, the accused (who was not his client). After adjourning to discuss this precarious situation, the Lords reconvened and
declared that "it is the judgement of this House that you are bound by law to answer all
such questions as shall be put to you." 8 WIOMORE, supra note 9, at 531 n.16.
14 . See Theodore Harman, Note, Fairness and the Doctrine of Subject Matter Waiver of the
Attorney-Clien't Privilege in ExtrajudicialDisclosure Situation, 1988 U. ILL. L REV. 1003, 100304 (1988).
15 David A. Nelson, Attorney-Client Privilege and ProceduralSafeguards: Are They Worth the
Costs?, 86 NW. L. REv. 368, 383-84 (1992); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1980) (privilege promotes broader interests of justice by encouraging free exchange of information); Union Carbide v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D.
Del. 1985) (purpose of the privilege is to encourage the free exchange of information).
16 Harman, supra note 14; see also Developments in the Law--Privileged Communications,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1501 (1985).
17 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; see also Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Work, 110 F.R.D.
500, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del.
1977).
18 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Weil Ceramics, 110 F.R.D. at 504; Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at
144.
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either the Wigmore standard or the standard set forth in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.9
B. The Wigmore Standard
Dean Wigmore, the eminent twentieth century evidence scholar,20 explained the concept of privilege in his 1904 treatise Evidence in Trials at Common Law.2 ' Dean Wigmore defined the attorney-client privilege as:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived.'s
This standard, hereinafter referred to as the Wigmore standard,
has received substantial deference in federal court opinions. At
present, five of the twelve circuits apply the Wigmore standard.'

19 89 F. Supp 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). A detailed analysis and breakdown of
each of these standards is undertaken infra Part IV.
20 John Henry Wigmore is often recognized as an expert legal mind in the field of
evidence. Just a few of these recognitions include: "the roster of scholars and judges . . .
reads like an honor roll of the legal profession[:] . . . Wigmore ...
Corwin...
Pound . . . Friendly.", Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); "my admiration for Professor Wigmore's scholarship is great ....
", Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 774 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); "a learned author, .. .",
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (Cardozo, J., relying on Wigmore's evidence
treatise). In addition, the Supreme Court has cited Wigmore on Evidence on over 340
occasions with almost one hundred of those cites relating to the doctrine of privilege.
21 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, chs. 79-84 (1904).
22 4 id. § 2292.
23 The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the Wigmore
standard. See United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1978); Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1964); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). cf. infra note 30 (the 'remaining seven circuits follow
the United Shoe standard).
While the Federal Circuit actually brings the total number of circuits in the federal
judiciary to thirteen, that circuit s absent from this figure due to the fact that the Federal Circuit established a policy of applying the procedural "law of the particular regional
circuit court where appeals from the district court would normally lie." Panduit Corp. v.
All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1572-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This is due to the
specialized jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, discussed infra
Part V. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
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C. The United Shoe Standard
On March 10, 1950, Judge Charles Edward Wyzanski, Jr., a
district court judge from Massachusetts,"s issued a pre-trial ruling
on what probably appeared at the time to be another routine
document discovery dispute.'s At issue in this ruling was the United Shoe Machinery Corporation's objection to the introduction of
nearly 800 exhibits on the ground that they fell within the scope
of the attorney-client privilege. 6
In his opinion, Judge Wyzanski went out on two limbs, one of
which was subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme
Court." The other has added much weight to its original offshoot; yet, it has grown cumbersome and needs reexamination.
This remaining limb of the United Shoe tree has come to be known
as the United Shoe or Wyzanski standard:
The [attorney-client] privilege applies only if (1) the asserted
holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member

24 Judge Wyzanski, appointed to the District Court of Massachusetts on December
19, 1941, was one of the youngest men ever appointed to the federal bench. He served
as a federal trial judge in Massachusetts for 45 years and handed down many controversial decisions, with his most noteworthy being in the field of civil rights. See generally
Charles E. Wyzanski Jr. Noted for ControversialRulings - Jurist Who Emphasized Civil Rights Dies,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1986, at 7; Eric Pace, Charles E. Wyzanski, 80, is Dead - Judge on U.S.
Court for 45 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1986, at 20 (late city final ed.)*.
Prior to his retirement, Judge Wyzanski was elevated to the position of Chief Judge
of the District Court of Massachusetts and sat by designation on the courts of appeal of
several circuits. Judge Wyzanski is widely recognized as an extraordinary district court
judge who remained at the district court level for 45 years not for lack of ability, but
because of his love for the trial court. See Mark L. Wolf, Few are Chosen: The Judicial Appointments of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Charles Edward Wyzanski, Jr., 74 MASS. L. REV.
221 (1989); Citation:Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., BOSTON BAR J., April 1982, at 5 (Award
for Distinguished Judicial Service presented to Wyzanski by the Boston Bar Foundation
and the Boston Bar Association).
25 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp 357 (D. Mass. 1950). This
document discovery dispute arose from a complaint filed by the government in 1947
alleging that United Shoe had violated section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing the manufacture of shoe machinery.
26 United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358.
27 The first determination by Judge Wyzanski was that the relationship between an
in-house patent attorney and his employer-corporation "is not that of attorney and client." Id. at 361. This assertion has been harshly criticized and was eventually disapproved
of by the Supreme Court. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). The details of Judge
Wyzanski's mischaracterization of the work of patent attorneys in United Shoe and its
harmful effects on the issue of the attorney-client privilege in patent law is discussed infra
Part III.A.
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of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law
or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or
tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not
waived by the client.s
This standard has garnered extraordinary precedential value since
its introduction in United Shoe, with seven of the twelve circuits'
adopting the Wyzanski standard. 0
III.

HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE TO PATENT LAW

While the attorney-client privilege has been rooted firmly in
the common law for over 400 years, its application in certain areas
of the law, paricularly patent law, has been less certain. This uncertainty stems from a combination of factors unique to the field
of patent law: the historical view that patent attorneys did not
practice law, the patent attorney's duty of candor to the Patent
and Trademark Office, and the misdirected focus on the information behind the communication."' Sometimes more than one,
and occasionally, all of these factors lurk behind a court's attempt
to determine the scope of the attorney-client privilege in patent
law. An explanation of each factor is necessary to understand the
varying law concerning the attorney-client privilege's correct interpretation in patent law.

28 United Shoe 89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
29 See supra note 23 (regarding the Federal Circuit's absence from this computation).
30 The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
have adopted the United Shoe standard. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 899 F.2d 1039
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509 (Ist Cir. 1986); In re Sealed
Case, 737 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d
Cir. 1979); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Knox, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir.
1965); cf. supra note 23 (the remaining five circuits follow the Wigmore standard).
31 These three factors behind the confusion of the attorney-client privilege's application to patent law all have the peculiar effect of serving only to support incorrect applications of the privilege.
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A. Patent Law as the Practice of Law
Only a half century ago, most of the work performed by patent lawyers was perceived by many judges and other learned citizens as not being part of the practice of law. Apart from other
peculiarities of patent law, this misconception alone had a drastic
effect on the development of the attorney-client privilege in patent
litigation.
Ironically, a large source of this mischaracterization was Judge
32
Wyzanski's opinion in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.
In discussing memoranda to and from United Shoe's patent department, the court found that "[a]ll the men in the [patent]
department function[ed] less as detailed legal advisors than as a
branch of an. enterprise founded on patents.""3 Judge Wyzanski
stated that "the relationship of a person in the patent department
to the corporation is not that of attorney and client. Hence the
communication of a person in the patent department is...
unprivileged."s
Soon after the United Shoe opinion, other courts expanded this
interpretation and portrayed the patent attorney as a lower caste
of lawyer. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,ss the Delaware District Court broadly defined the phrase "acting as a lawyer" as "encompass [ing] the whole orbit of legal functions. "s'
However, when it came to the work of patent attorneys, the court
had the following about-face response:
They do not "act as lawyers" when not primarily engaged in
legal activities; when largely concerned with technical aspects of
a business or engineering character, or competitive considerations in their companies' constant race for patent proficiency,
or the scope of public patents, or even the general application
of patent law to developments of their companies and competitors; when making initial office preparatory determinations of
patentability based on inventor's information, prior art, or legal
tests for invention and novelty; when drafting or comparing
patent specifications and claims; when preparing the application for letters patent or amendments thereto and prosecuting
same in the Patent Office; when handling interference proceed-

32

89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).

33

Id. at 360.

34 Id. at 361.
35 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
36 Id. at 794.
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ings in the Patent Office concerning patent applications.'7
This view of them patent practictioners as mundane paper-pushers,
unworthy of the same privileges as their astute non-patent colleagues, persisted with subsequent opinions.'
Within a decade of the Zenith opinion the Supreme Court
ruled that patent practice is the practice of law, putting this
mischaracterizationto rest. In Sperry v. F/oida,9 the Florida Bar
attempted to enjoin patent agents' from advising clients within
their state and argued that the various tasks performed by a patent attorney did in fact constitute the practice of law. In a longawaited and subsequently praised opinion, the Court held:
We do not question the determination that ... the preparation and prosecution of patent applications for others constitutes the practice of law. Such conduct inevitably requires the
practitioner to consider and advise his clients as to the patentability of their inventions under the statutory criteria, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103, 161, 171, as well as to consider the advisability of
relying upon alternative forms of protection which may be
available under state .law. It also involves his participation in
the drafting of the specification and claims of the patent application, 35 U.S.C. § 112, which this Court long ago noted "constitute[s] one of the ,most difficult legal instruments to draw
with accuracy ... .41

With this leveling of the attorney-client privilege playing field
for specialized attorneys after Sperry, the modem approach to the
privilege in patent law began" However, this approach tended to

37 Id. (footnote omitted) The court's rationale behind this statement was that some
of these tasks were not solely within the performance domain of a patent attorney. Conira Chore-Time Equip. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D. Mich.
1966) ("The mere fact that non-lawyers could also have performed the services in question does not in any way destroy the privilege.")
38 See Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.RLD. 26 (D. Md. 1974); Channel Master Corp. v. RMS Elecs., Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).
39 373 U.S. 379 (1963). While Speny did not deal with the attorney-client privilege
directly, the Supreme Court's decision that the work of patent attorneys is the practice of
law directly disapproved the Zenith attorney-client privilege decision.
40 ' A patent agent is a person, not an attorney, registered to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office.
41 Spery, 373 U.S. at 383 (citations omitted) (citing Topliff v. Toplf, 145 U.S. 156,
171 (1892)).
42 It should be noted that in light of the purposes and rationales behind the attorney-client privilege (see supra Part II.A.), even with this availing of the privilege to patent
attorneys, an attorney in any field must be acting as A lawyer, not as a mere business
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shift the focus of the privilege in patent situations to either the
patent attorney's relationship with the Patent and Trademark Office, or to the information communicated between the attorney
and client, neither of which was without nuances of its own.
B. Duty of Candor to the Patent and Trademark Office
To understand the patent attorney's responsibilities and relationship with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), it is necessary to understand the dual role of the patent attorney. In order
to file a patent application," anyone representing the applicant
(the inventor) must be registered to practice before the PTO."

person, for the privilege to apply.
43 The process of seeking a patent is known as patent prosecution. Briefly, the general process entails technical discussions with the inventor to ascertain possible patentable
inventions, reviewing existing patents in this field to determine if the invention is
anticipated (known as a prior art search), drafting the application's claims so as to represent the invention's novelty and uniqueness from the prior art, and submitting the patent
application to the PTO.
Upon receipt of the application, the PTO directs it to a patent examiner who has
an expertise in the specific field of the invention. The examiner then conducts an independent prior art search and evaluates the invention's patentability. A patentable invention will satisfy three conditions: (1) novelty (see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)), (2) utility (see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) and (3) non-obviousness (see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)). In
the extremely unlikely, yet ideal situation, the examiner reviews the application, finds it
patentable, and grants the patent
Almost always, however, the application is rejected and returned. At this point, an
interaction begins between the patent examiner and the patent attorney. The patent
attorney may reword the claimed invention to distinguish it further from the prior art.
Alternatively, the attorney may argue that the examiner's interpretation of the prior art
or the invention's obviousness is incorrect. After the examiner is satisfied that the invention is sufficiently distinguished from the prior art and non-obvious to those knowledgeable in the field, a patent is granted. This interaction produces a file of the communications between the examiner and attorney. This file details the scope of the claimed
invention. In a later infringement action, this file, under the doctrine of file wrapper
estoppel or prosecution history estoppel, may be used to define the scope of the patent.
Should the examiner reject the application after this interactive process, the patentability of such invention can be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See ROBERT A. CHOATE ET AL., PATENT LAW 538-39 (3d ed. 1987). See generally 60
AM. JUL 2D Patents §§ 293-523 (1987) (patent applications and examinations generally).
44 37 C.FR. § 1.31 (1993) ("An applicant for patent may file and prosecute his or
her own case, or he or she may be represented by a[n] . . . individual authorized to
practice before the Patent and Trademark Office in patent cases.")
Such individuals consist of patent attorneys, patent agents, or individuals given limited recognition to practice by the Director of Enrollment and Discipline under 37 C.F.R.
§ 10.9. While both patent attorneys and patent agents have equal status before the PTO
(see 37 C.F.IL § 10.6(a) & (b) (1993)), this Note deals only with the attorney-client privilege as it applies to the patent attorney. While the privilege's name and common law
nature might raise the assumption of total inapplicability of the privilege to patent
agents, this area is in dispute as well. See In Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D.
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This registration by the PTO is based upon the satisfaction of
several admission requirements,' most notably the successful
completion of the patent bar exam. This examination is designed
to test one's "possess[ion] of the legal . . .qualifications necessary
to . .. render applicants for patents valuable service[,]" 4' as well

as one's competence "to advise and assist applicants for patent in
the presentation and prosecution of their applications before the
Office." 47 Upon admittance to the patent bar, one becomes a
patent agent and may prosecute patents before the PTO. The
patent attorney, in contrast, must also be a licensed attorney.'
This dual certification of the patent attorney grants many privileges to members of the patent bar, yet it also imposes duties
upon the patent attorney from an additional governing body.
PTO registration requires a duty of candor to the PTO. This
duty, read into the specification provision of the federal code
chapter on patent applications,4 9 is clearly set forth in the Code
of Federal Regulations title on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. It reads:
Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the
Office all information known to that individual to be material
to patentability .... There is no duty to submit information

which is not material to the patentability of any existing

377, 392-94 (D.D.C. 1978); Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Immunity in the Eyes of the Accused Infringer, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 231,
239-41 (1987).
45 See 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(a) (1993). The other substantial requirement for admission is
the "possess[ion] of the ... scientific ... and technical qualifications necessary to enable him or her to render applicants for patents valuable service." 37 C.F.R. §
10.7(a) (2) (ii) (1993). Satisfaction of this requirement stems either from a previous scientific and technical education or substantial scientific and technical work experience.
46 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(a)(2)(ii) (1993).
47 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(a)(2)(iii) (1993).
48 Prior to November 15, 1938, all individuals registered by the PTO (then called
the Patent Office) were registered as attorneys, whether they were attorneys or not. See
37 C.F.R. § 10.6 (1993).
49 SeeJack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("[The
patent attorney) must turn all such factual information over in full to the Patent Office
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ..... "). This view is construed from the statute's text that,
"the specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same." 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1988).
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claim."

The existence of this duty has played a factor in the uncertain
relationship between the attorney-client privilege and patent attorneys. This uncertainty stems from cases which held that the duty
of candor to the PTO vitiated the attorney-client privilege with regard to patent attorneys."
The leading case is Jack Winter Inc. v. Koratron Co. 2 The district court in Jack Winter held that "the attorney exercises no discretion as to what portion of this information must be relayed to
the Patent Office .

.

. and hence[,] with respect to such material

he acts as a conduit between his client and the Patent Office.""3
This view, often called the "conduit" theory,'M vitiates the privilege because "a basic element required for the assertion of the
attorney-client privilege is absent-that is, a communication not
for relay but for the attorney's ears alone."55
While the conduit theory occasionally is raised in pre-trial
patent decisions, two flaws inherent in the Jack Winter approach
have led to its disfavor. First, courts with greater experience in
patent application procedures re-examined the conclusion reached
5 the Court of
in Jack Winter. In Knogo Corp. v. United States,"
Claims carefully reviewed the conduit theory and determined that
it "rest[ed] upon an oversimplification of the role of the patent attorney during the patent application process. " " By evaluating the
actual role of the patent attorney in the application process, the
court concluded that "[t]he attorney is not a mere conduit for
either the client's communications containing the technical information or the technical information itself. He does not file his
client's communications with the Patent Office[,] ... yet this is

50 Duty to disclose information material to patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1993).
51 This approach rests upon the incorrect assumption that all communications made
to the attorney must be communicated to the PTO under the duty of candor. Under
this assumption, the client has no confidence that his legal communications will remain
inviolate and thus, no privilege should attach to the patent attorney-client relationship.
See Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (D. Del. 1985);
Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977); Jack Winter, 50
F.R1D. at 225.
52 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
53 Id. at 228.
54 See Jeffrey G. Sheldon & Nancy S. Lambrecht, Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Cover
Patent Lawyers?, LA Daily J., Dec. 17, 1990, at 7; Battersby & Grimes, supra note 44, at
237.
55 Jack Winter, 50 F.R.D. at 228 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2311).
56 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
57 Id. at 941.

19941

NOTE-PRVILEGED ADVICE IN PATENT LITIGATION

the impression one derives from a reading of the Jack Winter
view. " ' This recent approach to the privilege, allowing it to co59
exist with the duty of disclosure in patent application scenarios,
was best summarized by the Knogo court:
A distinction can be made between the duty to disclose how to
make and use the invention and the mere funneling of technical information from the client through the attorney to the
Patent Office. The former is the job of the patent attorney,
while the latter is an inaccurate, and uninformed characterization of the patent attorneys [sic] role in the preparation and
prosecution of a patent application.'
Aside from the erroneous characterization underlying the
conduit theory, the Jack Winter court overlooked an additional
argument. While a duty of candor does exist in all dealings with
the PTO, a similar duty is imposed upon all attorneys in ex parte
proceedings, whether patent or otherwise." Under Rule 3.3 of
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "[i]n an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the
tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts
are adverse."62 Even in situations where "[t]he object of [the]
proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result[,]J "
such a duty upon the attorney has no effect upon the existence of
an attorney-client privilege. Therefore, in the patent lawyer's
world, as well as in the legal community at large, the attorneyclient privilege can in fact peacefully co-exist with duties of candor
toward decision-making bodies.'

58 Id.
59 See also FMC Corp. v. Old Dominion Brush Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 150 (W.D.
Mo. 1985).
60 Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 940-41.
61 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1984) (entitled Candor
Toward the Tribunal). The dealings in an ex parle proceeding can be analogized to the
patent attorney's dealings with the PTO during a patent application. In applying for a
patent, only that applicant's patent attorney details the status of the prior art and distinguishes the proposed invention's scope from this prior art, with no opportunity at that
time for potentially interested parties to respond.
62
63

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 cmt. (1984).

64 One-policy reason behind this coexistence is undoubtedly the privilege's protection of communications and not information, a topic dealt with infra Part III.C.
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C. The Misdirected Focus on Information
Another factor behind the confusing spectrum of attorneyclient privilege patent decisions involves the focus of the privilege-communications.' Unfortunately, this focus has often been
blurred to include the information communicated in addition to
the communications; in some circumstances, the focus has been
distorted to include only the information communicated. It is not
difficult to envision how this developed. To a layperson uninterested in the rationale behind the doctrine of privilege, the distinction between the information communicated and the communications probably goes unnoticed or seems like an obtuse academic
exercise. This blurring is further exacerbated by the fact that the
words "communication" and "communications" can have different
meanings due to their singular and plural distinction. For instance, the singular "communication" can invoke the definition
"the facts or information communicated,"' whereas the plural
"communications" can be read to mean "an interchange of
thoughts or opinions."' These definitions correspond directly to
the attorney-client privilege distinction discussed above; "communication" refers to the unprotected information communicated, and
"communications" refers to the relationship protected by the privilege.'
The most comprehensive opinion to attempt to clarify the
focus of the privilege is In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation.69 In
Ampicillin, the court found that "the distinction between the information and the communication [has] not [been] articulated clearly."7" Due to the policy rationale behind the privilege," the
court went on to hold that the attorney-client privilege provides
protection only to the communications "and not [to] facts or oth-

65

See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.

66

WEBSTE,'S

THIRD

NEw

INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY

460

(1986)

[hereinafter

WEBMTER'S].
67 Id.
68 This distinction is discussed at length infra Part IV.B.3(b), due to the wording of
the United Shoe standard, which altered Wigmore's plural usage of the term to its singular
form.
69 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
70 Id. at 389.
71 See supra Part IIA.
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er information contained [therein]."72 More recent case law outside of the patent realm has accepted this protection of the communications, and not the information, as the appropriate scope of
the attorney-client privilege."'
This misdirected focus on the information behind the communications, whether intentional or unintentional, has yielded
varying results regarding the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege. In patent cases, the focus on information tends to have
more dramatic results than in other areas of the law due to the
peculiar nature of the information behind patent related legal
communications. Two of these peculiarities have caused difficulty
in ascertaining the scope of the attorney-client privilege: communications containing technical information and communications
containing public information.
1.

Technical Information

While it is clear that the attomey-client privilege applies only
to communications of legal advice between an attorney and client, 4 definitions of what constitutes legal advice have on occasion
omitted the work performed by patent attorneys.75 This exclusive
definition of legal advice, and the accompanying exclusion from
the attorney-client privilege's protection, was partially due to the

72 Ampicillin, 81 F.R.D. at 389. Under the doctrine of privilege, the facts communicated in a privileged relationship continue to be accessible to examination. "Although
neither [party to the communication] may be questioned directly regarding the privileged
communication per se, the [party revealing the information in the communication] may
always be questioned on the facts behind the communication." Id. at 391 n.23 (citing 2
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, §§ 503(a)(4)-(b)(3)
(1975)).
A good example of this Ampicillin scenario was given by the Knogo court: "[i]n other words, the client cannot assert the privilege if asked how the invention works; but he
can assert the privilege if he is asked to recount what he told his attorney concerning
how the invention works." Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 941
1
(Ct. Cl. 1980).
73 See In re 6 Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("'Thus information other than "communications" . . . are unprotected.'" (citing In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09 (D.C. Cir.
1982))); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifng Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Prvileg 69 NOTRE DAME L REV. 157, 171-72 (1993) ("Remember that the
attorney-client privilege does not (at least in theory) protect the litigant from supplying
relevant facts to its opponent; the privilege protects only the communication and not the
underlying information.").
74 See supra text accompanying notes 22 & 28 (federal standards for the attorneyclient privilege).
75 See supra Part IIIA.
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technical nature of the patent attorney's work product.
Due to the technical material included in most, if not all,
patent prosecution related communications, courts have previously
misapplied the attorney-client privilege by focusing on the presence of this technical information rather than concentrating on
the relationship between the attorney and client. Under the guise
of treating patent related legal advice as purely business or technical advice, courts have held that "[c]ommunications dealing...
with the technical engineering aspects of patent prosecution or
with other matters which may as easily be handled by laymen are
not privileged."76
Conversely, some courts have held that the presence of technical information does not destroy the privilege's protection. In
Chore-Time Equipment Inc. v. Big Dutchman Inc.," the court, while
not disavowing its inappropriate concern with the information
communicated, granted the privilege to such technical communications. Demonstrating an understanding of the dual role of the
patent attorney,' Chore-Time held that "[w]here a lawyer possesses
multifarious talents, his clients should not be deprived of the attorney-client privilege, where applicable, simply because their correspondence is also concerned with highly technical matters. " "
The debate over whether the presence of technical information
destroys the privilege's protection continues today. If a trend exists
in patent law, however, it points toward applying the privilege to
such technically oriented communications.80
2.

Public Information

Some courts, erroneously focusing on the information behind
attorney-client communications, some courts have also used a
public information rationale to refuse to apply the privilege to
patent related legal communications. This approach hinges the
privilege's protection upon the confidentiality or public availability
76 Georgia Pac. Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794
(D. Del. 1954) and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D.
Mass. 1950)).
77 255 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
78 See supra Part III.B.
79 Chore-Time, 255 F. Supp. at 1023.
80 See FMC Corp. v. Old Dominion Brush Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 150, 150-51
(W.D. Mo. 1985); Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 940-41 (Ct. Cl.
1980); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 388-90 (D.D.C. 1978); see also
Sheldon & Lambrecht, supra note 54, at 7.
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of the information communicated. The public information rationale seems to have tenuously developed from the wording of the
.privilege, which requires that the client believe that his discussions
with the attorney will be kept confidential for the privilege's protection to apply. However, due to -subsequent paraphrasing and
misinterpretation, this requirement has been recruited by advocates of this rationale to eliminate communications involving publicly available information from the scope of the attorney-client
privilege.
The court in Congoleum Industries Inc. v. G A F Corp., building upon the foundation provided by United Shoe and Zenith, held
that documents containing legal advice which made reference to
public information "as opposed to legal advice based upon confidential information [were] for this reason . . .without the assert-

ed privilege." 2 Following the Congoleum approach, the court in
Community Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FederalHome Loan Bank Board,
went a step further and ruled that the privilege did not extend to
correspondence containing advice based upon public information
rather than confidential information.' Since the communication
in Community Savings & Loan "consisted almost entirely of material
which was in the public record[,]" the court held that no protection from the attorney-client privilege applied to the attorney's
opinions based upon this information.' This "publicly available
information" exclusion operates to deny the privilege's protection
to legal opinions from the patent attorney to his client based
86
upon the prior art.
Similar to the duty of candor approach, the public information rationale has been used to deny the attorney-client privilege
to communications related to patent prosecution. This stems from
the fact that, under the conduit theory, any information disclosed
to the patent attorney during the patent application process is
assumed to become part of the public record when the patent
issues. Assuming arguendo that this theory was. true,87 recent pat-

81 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aftd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973).
82 Congoleur, 49 F.R.D. at 86.
83 68 F.R.D. 378 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
84 Id. at 382.
85 Id.
86 In patent law, the term "prior art" refers to any relevant knowledge, acts, descriptions and patents which pertain to, but predate, the invention in question. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1193 (6th ed. 1990).
87 But see supra Part II.B.
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ent opinions have rebuked the concept that the eventual public
disclosure at the patent's issuance should vitiate the privilege. In
Knogo, which dealt with a combination of patent factors,' the
court held that "[t] he fact that much of the technical information
in one form or another finds its way into the patent application,
to be made public when the patent issues, should not preclude
the assertion of the privilege over the communication in which
that information was disclosed to the attorney."89 While this facet
of the public information rationale appears more settled than the
facet dealing with patent attorney's opinions based upon information within the public domain, both situations must be considered
in light of the policy interests underlying the entire doctrine of
privilege. While these two types of information tend to cause confusion in the application of the privilege, they are in fact irrelevant under a proper analysis of the attorney-client privilege; the
scope of the attorney-client privilege protects the communications
between the attorney and client-not the information within those
communications.
V. RELOCATING THE BI-DIRECTIONAL APPROACH WITHIN THE
CURRENT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE STANDARDS

Striving to bring the present application of the attorney-client
privilege in line with the policy rationales underlying its existence,
this Note advocates a bi-directional application of the privilege.
First, this Note demonstrates that current standards of the attorney-client privilege support such an interpretation. This support
can be found through a detailed historical and linguistic analysis
of each standard.
A.

A New Look at the Wigmore Standard

Understanding the context surrounding the Wigmore standard"° is crucial to its re-evaluation.9' Before enunciating his relationship-specific privilege standards,92 Dean Wigmore discussed

88 The Knogo court dealt with the duty of candor, technical information, and the
publicly available information factors in trying to clarify this area of the law.
89 Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 941 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
90 See supra Part II.A
91 This context exists in 4 WIGMORE, supra note 21, pt. III, tit. II, subtit. III (subtitle
on Testimonial Privilege).
92 Examples of these relationship-specific privileges are the spousal privilege and the
attorney-client privilege. See supra note 9.
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the broader topic of "Confidential Communications in General"93
in his 1904 treatise Evidence in Trials at Common, Law.' Looking at
the principle of privilege "as an exception to the general liability
of every person to give testimony to all facts inquired of in a.
court of justice,"" Wigmore ascertained "four fundamental conditions ... as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against
the disclosure of communications between persons standing in a
given relation."" These four fundamental conditions, valuable
context to any examination of a Wigmore relationship-based privilege,97 are:
(1) The communications must originate in confidence
that they will not be disclosed;
(2)

This element of confidentiality must be essential to the

full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered;
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation."

Only the first requirement relates directly to the communications between the parties. The emphasis of this condition, evident
from Wigmore's typeface selection, is the "confidence that [these
communications] will not be disclosed."' Hence, with regard to
the actual communications, the parties must only have the intent
to keep such communications in confidence for the general doctrine of privileged communications to apply."° This context,

93 4

WIGMORE,

supra note 21, ch. 79.

94 4 WIGMORE, supra note 21.
95 4 id. § 2295, at 3185.
96 4 id.
97 The relationship-specific privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, are a
subtopic within Wigmore's general discussion on privileged communications. Hence, the
conditions of "confidential communications in general" (4 id. at ch. 79), not only provide
context to, but also govern, the relationship-specific privileges. See 4 id. § 2285.
98 4 id. § 2285, at 3185.
99 4 id.
100 Of course, the other three general conditions of Wigmore's privileged communications doctrine cannot be overlooked. However, none of the remaining requirements
mandate the judiciary to intrude into the communications themselves. Factor two merely
requires that the relationship in question necessitate confidentiality for its full and satisfactory maintenance. The third condition requires only societal support in favor of the
privileged relationship. The fourth condition is a harm/benefit balancing between the
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placing import upon the confidence behind the communications,
as well as the policy behind the attorney-client privilege,' ° must
be considered in re-evaluating the Wigmore standard.
When re-examining his relationship-specific attorney-client
privilege, Wigmore's chosen phrasing and punctuation requires
careful analysis to ascertain its original intent. To facilitate this
careful examination, consider the identical text of the Wigmore
standard..2 in the following format:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
the communications relating to that purpose,
made in confidence by the client,
are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser,
except the protection be waived.101

The above format, emphasizing Wigmore's chosen phrasing, demonstrates that the Wigmore standard hinges on five, not eight,
distinct factors.
Note that only the third factor intrudes into the sphere of the
communications themselves."' The third phrase-"made in confi-

damage caused to the relationship by disclosure and the benefit of judicially enforced
truth seeking. Plainly, these conditions are satisfied in the case of the attorney-client relationship, not only from the goals and rationales behind the attomey-client privilege (see
supra Part II.A.), but due to the fact that the attorney-client privilege exists as a subpart
of this general privileged communications doctrine. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2285, at
3185-86 ("That these conditions are present in most of the recognized privileges is plain
enough[;] . . . between the Attorney and Client, for example, all four are present ....
").
101 See supra Part II.A.
102 Dean Wigmore's general definition of the attorney-client privilege is as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the
protection be waived.
4

supra note 21, § 2292; see also supra Part II.B.
103 Throughout the remainder of this Note, all references to certain phrases of the
Wigmore standard will be addressed by these five-factor identification numbers.
104 Once again, however, we cannot completely ignore the other four factors. The
first factor is a description of the relationship required to qualify for initial consideration
for protection under the attorney-client privilege. Under this description, the client must
be seeking legal advice of any type from an attorney. This factor's purpose is to insure
that the privilege is only applied where the client is in a communicative relationship with
a qualified attorney serving in a legal advisory capacity.
The second factor dictates what is at issue in any application of the attorney-client
privilege: the communications. The end of the factor - "relating to that purpose," WIGMORE,
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dence by the client,"-can be read in two ways: One seriously
-altering the privilege as it stood at the time of Wigmore's writing,
the ofher accurately interpreting the phrase in a manner consistent with the remainder of Wigmore's privilege chapter as well as
the legal precedent prior to the standard's publication." s
The first reading, which is inconsistent with Wigmore's phrasing, proffers that this third phrase actually consists of two phrases,
or two prongs. These prongs-"made in confidence" and "by the
client"-would therefore both relate back and attach to the word
"Communications" in the second phrase of the standard. Under
this interpretation, the privilege applies only to communications
made in confidence, and narrowing the scope of the privilege
further, to only the portion of those "communications made in
confidence" which were made by the client to the attorney. This is
an incorrect reading of the Wigmore standard's language. From a
linguistic viewpoint, this interpretation lacks clear support, as evidenced by Wigmore's chosen punctuation. Specifically, a comma
between the phrases "made in confidence" and "by the client"
would be necessary for this interpretation to be valid. The pres-

mandates that the communications be tied into the legal advisory relationship of the
previous phrase.
The fourth factor lays bare what effect the privilege has upon the requisite relationship. The words "at his instance" refer to the client having the-sole right to exercise the
privilege, a hombook constant which is not refuted in any way by this interpretive study.
See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) ("[T]he [right to assert thel privilege is
that of the client alone, and no rule prohibits the [client] from divulging his own secrets ...
."). The remainder of this phrase reinforces that once the client opts for the
privilege to apply, neither the client nor the attorney can be compelled t6 disclose their
communications as evidence.
Lastly, the fifth fhctor places a slight exception on the general definition, specifically
that the privilege will apply "except [where] the privilege [has been] waived." This term
has come to mean that either explicit or implicit waiver will vitiate the privilege, and in
most reported cases, such a waiver is actually inadvertent. See James M. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 511 (1985); see generally, 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, §§ 2327-29; Harman, supra note
14.
105 See Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 72, 76 (1881) (The privilege "extends to communications in reference to all matters which are the proper subject of professional employment."); Jenkinson v. Andrews, 5 Blackf. 465 (1840) (information given by attorney to client held privileged); Hughes v. Biddulph, 4 Russ. 190 (1827); Annesley v. Earl of
Anglesea, 77 How. St. Tr. 1225 (1743); 4 WIGMoRE, supra note 21, § 2320; Anon. ("C."),
repinted in THE LAW MAGAzINE, xvii, 68 (1837) ("[Through skilled attorneys] every man's
case is brought with nearly equal ability and chance of success . . . [and] [sluch equality

never can exist, unless client and attorney are completely identified, and their communications held to be impervious to judicial investigation, as if they never had been uttered.").
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ence of a comma in that location would make the phrase "made
in confidence" an appositive."' Both the appositive, "made in
confidence," and the subsequent phrase "by the client" would
refer to the "communications." However, without a comma between "made in confidence" and "by the client," 07 no appositive
is created and, therefore, the two pronged reading is invalid.'
Wigmore's punctuation and other external evidence'09 seems
to have intended the alternative reading. It requires only that the
client regard the "communications" of the second phrase as confidential-in both directions-from the client to the attorney and
from the attorney to the client. This reading applies the phrase "made
in confidence" to the "communications" and the phrase "by the
client" to the aforementioned confidence requirement. Such an
interpretation, consistent with Wigmore's phrasing"0 and the policy of encouraging full and frank communications between attorney and client,"' would protect communications between attorney and client in both directions, so long as their communications
were believed to be confidential by the client.

106 An appositive is a grammatical apposition. An apposition is "a grammatical construction that consists of two nouns or noun equivalents referring to the same person or
thing standing in the same syntactical relation to the rest of the sentence without being
joined to each other by a coordinating conjunction, and typically adjacent to each other."
WEBSTER'S, supra note 66, at 105.
An example of an appositive is the phrase "shy and embarrassed" in the sentence:
"The child, shy and embarrassed, said nothing." Id.
107 Had Wigmore placed a conjunction at this location, for example - "and", the
same effect of making this third phrase two-pronged would have resulted.
108 See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968). In Natta, the Tenth Circuit
explicitly dealt with the question of what portion of the standard the "by the client"
phrase applied to, determining that
[Appellant's] reliance on [the numbering present in the Wigmore standard in
Evidence in Trials at Common Law] is misplaced. Reference is there made to communications "by the client." In the discussion which follows, Wigmore makes it
clear that the reference is to differentiate between communications made by the
client and those made by a third person.
Natta, 392 F.2d at 692.
The Natta court went on to hold that "[t]he recognition that privilege extends to statements of a lawyer to a client is necessary to prevent the use of the lawyer's statements as
admissions of the client." Id. at 693. The holding in Natta demonstrates that a twopronged reading of the third factor "made in confidence by the client" is incorrect. See
also 8 in 1 Pet Products, Inc. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("the law
is settled that the advice of counsel based upon the confidential communications of a
client is privileged.").
109 See 4 WIGmoRE, supra note 21, § 2320; see also supra note 105.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 103 & 108.
111 See supra Part 11.A.
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In addition to this interpretation's linguistic support, it is
undeniable from a historical perspective that the privilege was bidirectional when first published in 1904.112 During his discussion
of the words "by the client," Wigmore devotes an entire section of
his commentary to privileged communications from attorney to
client, concluding that the fact "that the attorney's communications to
the client are also within the -privilege was always assumed in the
earlier cases and has seldom been brought into question."113
While this strict emphasis on original phrasing may seem
overly academic, Wigmore himself realized and was concerned
about the difficulty in drafting a standard which would be read
uniformly. In the sentence immediately preceding his general
definition of the attorney-client privilege, Wigmore arguably sets
forth a caveat against misapplication of the privilege. Specifically,
Wigmore wrote, "the phrasing of the general principle so as to
represent all its essentials, but only essentials, and to group them in
a natural sequence is a matter of some difficulty." 114 Hence, from
his terminology to his punctuation, Wigmore didn't arrange these
essentials of the attorney-client privilege whimsically or in haste,
but in a careful and considered manner.
Therefore, Wigmore's chosen wording of the attorney-client
privilege standard, currently relied upon in five circuits,"5 reveals
that Wigmore's standard applied in a bi-directional manner to
protect both sides of the attorney-client communicative relationship. Arguably, courts should apply Wigmore's standard in such a
manner consistent with its original intent and the policy behind
the privilege it was put forth to represent.
B. Reconsidering the Foundation and True Meaning Behind the
United Shoe Standard
For reasons not immediately apparent, Judge Wyzanski set
forth a new standard of the attorney-client privilege in his United

112 See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2320.
113 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2320, at 628. This section in the 1961 McNaughton
revision cites only three cases questioning the bi-directionality of the privilege, each only
partially contradicting Wigmore's statement. Id. at 628 n.2; 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRLAlS AT COMMON LAW § 2320, at 185 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1991 Supp.).
Unfortunately, Wigmore himself was never required to expand upon his statements
in § 2320, as no case directly conflicted with his bi-directional approach until seven years
after his death, when Judge Wyzanski put forth his United Shoe opinion.
114 4 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2292, at 3204 (emphasis added).
115 See supra note 23.
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Shoe opinion."' One might assume that these "main qualifications which are necessary,"" 7 when presented with such a formal
and analytical approach to the age-old privilege," were gleaned
directly and accurately from either legal precedent or accepted
learned treatises. However, a closer examination of Judge
Wyzanski's opinion reveals that he paraphrased a previous standard with his own wording. His paraphrasing moreover permitted
ambiguous interpretation by later courts contrary to the intended
scope of the privilege at the time of United Shoe.
1.

The United Shoe Standard's Dearth of Precedential Case Law
Sources

Prior to introducing his standard for the attorney-client privilege, Judge Wyzanski explained the policy considerations behind
the privilege. This explanation cited two cases which dealt with aspects of the attorney-client privilege tangentially related to the
issues in United Shoe. These cases represent the only case law relied
upon in creating the United Shoe standard.1
The first case was Hunt v. Blackburn, 20 an 1888 United States
Supreme Court case. Its only relationship to the attomey-client
privilege was the defendant's last chance attempt to salvage her
case.' The defendant, argued that her counsel deceived and

116 This newer standard of the attorney-client privilege, put forth by Judge Wyzanski
in United Shoe reads as follows:
The [attorney-client] privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer, (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some
legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950); see
also supra Part II.C.
117 United Shoe 89 F. Supp. at 358 (Judge Wyzanski used the sentence, "[I]t will be
enough now to note in general, and later to apply in detail, the main qualifications
which are necessary[,]" as a segue to setting forth his standard of the privilege.).
118 See supra Part II.A.
119 This analysis of the United Shoe attorney-client privilege standard makes the assumption that if Judge Wyzanski had relied directly or even substantially upon prior case
law or any other published source in arranging his standard, he would have cited to the
appropriate sources.
120 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
121 Id. at 470.
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misadvised her, she was ignorant of her rights, aid therefore she
should not have been held to the outcomes of previous adjudications.' Interestingly, the attorney-client privilege was implicated
by her additional ,claim "that her attorney, on the ground of privileged communications, should not be permitted to defend himself
by testifying to the facts and circumstances under which he advised her and the advice which he actually gave."" The Court,
denying this attempt by the defendant to avoid an implied waiver'
of the privilege, 2 4 issued the following policy rationale behind
the attorney-client privilege:
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications necessary between client and attorney is founded upon
the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of
the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in
its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily
availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure. 125
While this is an accurate policy statement-both in 1888 and
today-Wyzanski's limited reliance on Hunt in his introductory
statement that "[the attorney-client privilege] is founded upon the
belief that it is necessary 'in the interest and administration of
justice- 123 lends no authority to his formalistic standard which
followed.
Judge Wyzanski's only other citation in support of his privilege standard was People's Bank v. Brown,1 27 a Third Circuit case
which was nearly half a century old at the time of United Shoe.
Wyzanski paraphrased a very small portion of the opin-

122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 470-71 ("[T]he [right to assert the attorney-client] privilege is that of the
client alone, and no rule prohibits the latter from divulging [her] own secrets; and if
the client has voluntarily waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close the
mouth of the attorney. When Mrs. Blackburn entered upon a line of defence which
involved what transpired between herself and [her attorney], and respecting what she
testified, she waived her right to object to his giving his own account of the matter."); see
also Grippando, supra note 104.
125 Hun4 128 U.S. at 470.
126 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
(quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
127 112 F. 652 (3d Cir. 1902).
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ion 28--which it only related to how, not where or when, to apply the privilege-stating that "the privilege should be strictly construed in accordance with its object."" While Wyzanski once
again cites to an accurate policy statement regarding the privilege,5 ° it does not support the formal standard he created.
2.

The Influence of Dean Wigmore on the United Shoe Standard

Since Wyzanski did not cite to any authority to derive his
standard, the next step in analyzing the merit of the United Shoe
standard is to ascertain other possible uncited influences behind
Judge Wyzanski's terminology."3 '
Chronologically, it is likely that Wigmore's standard played
some part in the formulation of Judge Wyzanski's United Shoe standard.12 For instance, other district courts had already begun
citing to the Wigmore standard as the well-settled rule in this area

128 While certainly not the linchpin of this Note's support of the bi-directional attorney-client privilege, it is an interesting aside to consider the portion of the People's
Bank's discussion of the privilege left unmentioned by Judge Wyzanski. It is difficult to
believe that Judge Wyzanski could have intended his standard to be truly one-directional
where the first sentence of the privilege discussion in People's Bank - the most recent
decision cited by Wyzanski in relation to the foundation of his standard - put forth
that:
This court has neither the authority nor inclination to repudiate the rule which
protects from exposure, unless with the client's consent, all communications between
him and his counse4 made during the subsistence of that relation, in reference to
any matter respecting what the latter has been, and properly could be, professionally consulted.
Id. at 654 (emphasis added). This terminology, like almost all such relied upon pre-United
Shoe, echoes Wigmore's study that the privilege applies to the interaction between both
parties to the relationship, not merely the traffic of words leaving the client's lips destined for the attorney's ears.
129 United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358 (citing People's Bank, 112 F. at 652 (discussing the
necessity of balancing the value of the privileged relationship with the consequences of
the resulting suppression of evidence)).
130 Wigmore also realized the necessity of applying the attorney-client privilege in a
careful manner. His commentary immediately preceding his general definition of the
standard reads, "[the privilege] ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle." 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 9, § 2291, at 554.
131 As a safety mechanism underlying the assumption of accurate citation by Judge
Wyzanski (see supra note 119), an on-line search (LEXIS, MEGA library) of all United
States case law prior to March 10, 1950 (the date of the United Shoe opinion) was undertaken to search for any occurrences of the particular terminology used in the United Shoe
standard, either in whole or in part. No substantially similar wording (nor meaning similar to the one-directional reading, for that sake) was ever found.
132 Forty-six years, as well as twelve editions of Evidence in Trials at Common Law,
separate Wigmore's standard from the United Shoe holding chronologically.
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prior to the time of the United Shoe holding.'
In fact, Judge
Wyzanski's very own district court had relied on Wigmore's treatise
in deciding a question of attorney-client privilege within three
years of the decision in United Shoe."M Despite Dean Wigmore's
influence in the field of evidence throughout the legal community
in 1950, the most convincing evidence that Judge Wyzanski was
influenced by Wigmore's approach lies within the United Shoe opinions of March 10, 1950 themselves."
The first of these opinions,' also resolving a document dispute,3 pertained to statements of individual employees as extrajudicial admissions attributable to the corporation under the regular business entry statute." Judge Wyzanski, resolving this evidentiary dispute, looked for advice to Dean Wigmore's treatise on
three occasions where no case law supporting his position existed
within the First Circuit. 9
The second of the United Shoe opinions handed down that day
by Judge Wyzanski, and certainly the more notorious decision of
the two, set forth the aforementioned United Shoe standard for the
first time." Aside from enunciating his newly devised standard,
Judge Wyzanski also resolved several issues in this pre-trial discovery dispute, one of which was whether information disclosed by a
person outside of the defendant's organization could be privileged.'' In ascertaining that, "for example, there is no privilege
for so much of a lawyer's letter, report or opinion as [it] relates
to a fact gleaned from a witness,"" Judge Wyzanski cited directly
to Wigmore's commentary to the Wigmore standard. To further
bolster this example, Wyzanski recommended a perusal of
Wigmore's Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revealing his defer-

133 See In re Turner, 51 F. Supp. 740, 743 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
134 See Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684, 686 (D. Mass.
1947).
135 On March 10, 1950, Judge Wyzanski handed down two pre-trial opinions related
to the United Shoe dispute. Compare United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950) [hereinafter United Shoe (extrajudicial admissions ruling)] with
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
136 United Shoe (extrajudicial admissions ruling), 89 F. Supp. at 349.
137 Cf. supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
138 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988).
139 United Shoe (extrajudicial admissions ruling), 89 F. Supp. at 351-52 (citing 2 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1048, 1057(3), 1078 (3d ed.
1907)).
140 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
141 Id. at 359.
142 Id.
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The True Meaning of the United Shoe Standard

Combining the lack of explicit citations in United Shoe to any
previous standard," the unsuccessful search for any substantially
similar, yet uncited, case law, 4' and Judge Wyzanski's certain
knowledge of the Wigmore standard,"4 it becomes evident that
in enunciating his United Shoe standard, Judge Wyzanski intended
to expand upon the Wigmore language by adding further precision to the then-prevailing attorney-client privilege standard. 47 A
direct comparison of the United Shoe language and the Wigmore
standard will illustrate their differences.'
This will first address
direct carryovers of the Wigmore language into the United Shoe
standard. Once that has eliminated a large portion of the United
Shoe language from our scrutiny, the remaining language will disclose Judge Wyzanski's divergences in terminology from the
Wigmore standard. It is through an examination of these divergences in terminology that the exact scope of the United Shoe standard will become clear.
(a) Terminology common to both the United Shoe and Wigmore
standards.-Much of Judge Wyzanski's language in the United Shoe
standard is substantially similar to that of Dean Wigmore.
Comparing these "equal" phrases of the two standards does little
143 United Shoe 89 F. Supp. at 359 (citing 4 WIGMORE, supra note 139, § 2317).
This citation to section 2317 is convincing evidence of Judge Wyzanski's awareness
and knowledge of the Wigmore standard of attorney-client privilege at the time of his
penning the United Shoe standard, as that section is part of Wigmore's Chapter 82, entitled "Communications Between Attorney and Client." More explicitly, section 2317 deals
with certain situations pertaining to the "by the client" phrase of the actual Wigmore
standard previously enunciated. See supa notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
144 See supra Part IV.B.1.
145 See supra note 131.
146 See supra Part W.B.2.
147 The only other possibility is that Judge Wyzanski actually intended to dramatically
alter the scope of the attorney-client privilege by defining it in a one-directional manner.
Such a definition would have been contrary to the policy supporting the mere existence
of an attorney-client privilege (see supra Part ILA-) and therefore would have been not
only inappropriate, but incorrect as well.

1481n attempting this comparison, it may be helpful to view the
terminology of either standard in its entirety at some point. See supra
text accompanying notes 22 & 28 (Wigmore standard and United
Shoe standard respectively).
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to clarify the scope of the United Shoe standard with regard to the
Wigmore standard. Therefore, while these "equal" phrases will not
be omitted from the comparison of the standards, they will- merely
be
presented
side-by-side
in
the
following
piecemeal
comparison.

4

1

Wigmore 150

United Shoel5'

(1) Where legal advice of
any kind is sought ...

(3) ... (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or
(iii) -assistance in some legal
proceeding, ...

from a professional
legal adviser ...

(2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court,
or his subordinate ... 52

... in his capacity as such, ...

(2) ... (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a
lawyer; ...

149 This piecemeal comparison of the two standards is presented in the order of the
five-factor Wigmore standard (developed supra Part IVA.). Most of these paired phrases
are substantially similar in meaning so as to require no additional commentary. However,
slight divergences are dealt with through additional footnoting and large divergences
from the Wigmore terminology are evidenced by the notation '[see discussion below]'
and dealt with infra Part IV.B.3(b). Additionally; Part IV.B.3(b) will discuss any terminological additions to the Wigmore standard by Judge Wyzanski; such additions are omitted
from the following comparison in order to maintain its continuity, as they have no "partner" in the Wigmore terminology.
150 The parenthetical numbers preceding Wigmore's phrases are taken from the fivefactor standard developed and explained in detail previously. See supra text accompanying
note 103.
151 The parenthetical numbers preceding Judge Wyzanski's phrasing are taken directly
from his United Shoe opinion. See supra text accompanying note 28.
152 The addition of the phrase "or his subordinate" by Judge Wyzanski does not
effect a difference between the standards. While not explicitly mentioned in Wigmore's
standard, his extensive commentary following the standard deals with this situation in a
section entitled, "Communication to an Agent of the Attorney." Wigmore wrote: "It has
never been questioned that the privilege protects communications to the attorney's cderks
and his other agents (including stenographers) for rendering his services." 4 WIGMORE,
supra note 21, § 2301, at 583.
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relating to that purpose ...

(3) made in confidence by
the client, ...
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(3) the communication relates to
a fact of which the attorney was
informed ...
[see discussion below]
(3) ... (a) by his client (b) without

the presence of strangers ...
[see discussion below]

(4) are at his instance
permanently protected from
disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, ...

(4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed ...

(5) except the protection be
waived.

(4) ... and (b) not waived by the

client.

This comparison of the two attorney-client privilege standards
demonstrates that any distinctions drawn between the United Shoe
and Wigmore standards' scope are based upon slight terminological differences. With these "equal" phrases removed from further
analysis, comparison of the two standards can focus upon these
possible terminological "contradictions" between the United Shoe
standard and its predecessor, the Wigmore standard.
(b) Terminological "contradictions" between the United Shoe and
Wigmore standards.-In comparing the language behind the United
Shoe and Wigmore attorney-client privilege standards, four phrases
from the United Shoe language seem to contradict the language
chosen by Wigmore to represent the essentials15 of the privilege.
Two of these phrases are additions to the terminology chosen by
Wigmore, direct attempts by Judge Wyzanski to increase the
specificity of the existing privilege standard. The other two are
"contradictory" phrases---slight differences between the chosen
language of Judge Wyzanski and Dean Wigmore-and are
ambiguous enough to have caused the uncertainty relating to the
directionality of the United Shoe standard. Both these additional

153 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
154 See text accompanying note 151. These two "contradictory" phrases are identified
by the '[see discussion below]' notation in the previous piecemeal comparison of the
United Shoe and Wigmore standards. See supra Part IV.B.3(a).
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and "contradictory" phrases, when discussed in the context of the
Wigmore standard, reveal Judge Wyzanski's intent to restate the
attorney-client privilege in a manner consistent with both the
underlying policy behind the privilege and the prevailing Wigmore
standard of the time.
The first of Judge Wyzanski's additions to the specificity of the
Wigmore standard is the introduction and first clause of the United
Shoe standard, which states that "[t]he privilege applies only if (1)
the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
.... "'While from the text of the Wigmore standard
alone this principle is not apparent, its presence in the United Shoe
standard causes no disparity among the application of the standards. With regard to situations where the "holder of the privilege
is

. .

a client,"156 it is clear that Wigmore's standard applies:

Not only are the client's confidence 57 and the client's request
for protection from disclosure" required for the privilege to apply, but one would be hard pressed to define anyone seeking legal
advice "from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such"' as anything but a client. The other half of this first United Shoe phrase, stating that "the privilege applies . . . if the asserted holder ...

sought to become a client,""6 is also clearly with-

in the domain of Wigmore's definition of the attorney-client privilege. While at first glance both Wigmore's and Wyzanski's use of
the term "sought" could mislead one seeking to harmonize the
standards, the harmony instead lies within Wigmore's extensive
commentary to his standard. Judge Wyzanski's inclusion of potential clients within the privilege's protection was always implicit in
the Wigmore standard, though not necessarily apparent on its
face. Wigmore's commentary in the section entitled "Time of con-

155 See supra text accompanying note 28 (introduction and first phrase of the United
Shoe standard).
156 This is the first possible scenario under the first United Shoe phrase. See supra text
accompanying note 28.
157 See supra notes 99-100, 103-04 and accompanying text (third Wigmore phrase).
158 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (fourth Wigmore phrase).
159 See generally supra note 103 and accompanying text (first Wigmore phrase).
160 This is the second possible scenario under the first United Shoe phrase. See supra
text accompanying note 28.
161 While both standards employ the term "sought" in their first phrase, the
meanings are entirely different. Wigmore's use requires the client to have "sought" legal
advice (Wyzanski opted for the term "securing" legal advice), while Judge Wyzanski's use
exhibits the rule that those persons who "sought to become" clients, but in actuality did
not receive representation, can still avail themselves of the privilege's protection.
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sultation; Rejection of retainer by attorney, " "' posits that "[a]n
interesting question, however, arises when the communication is
made pending negotiations for the retainer."6 ' Wigmore's assessment
of this situation is exactly as Judge Wyzanski would later include in
the United Shoe standard, that "[h]ere it would seem plain by the
reason of the privilege, that, since the would-be client cannot certainly predict the attorney's acceptance of the employment, the
former must be protected in his preliminary statements when
making the overtures, even if the overture is refused.""6 Therefore, Judge Wyzanski's addition of the phrase "the privilege applies
only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client,"'
taking into account Wigmore's phrasing
within his standard and commentary, while a meritorious addition
from a thoroughness standpoint, has no effect on any attempt to
distinguish the scope of the two standards.
The second of these additions to the Wigmore standard exists
in section (d) of the third United Shoe clause, which requires that
the communication was "not (d) for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; ....
'"'Once again, the Wigmore standard, while
seemingly remiss on its face, encompasses this facet of the privilege as well. In Wigmore's commentary dealing with the first
clause of his attomey-client privilege standard, Wigmore devoted
two sections to this issue, the first entitled "Advice in a criminal or
fraudulent transaction."167 In this discussion Wigmore wrote, "[it
has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot
avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime
or other evil enterprise. " " In setting forth this already wellfounded condition of the privilege, Wigmore detailed the policy of
such a crime/fraud exception, specifically that "logically ... no
such enterprise falls within the just scope of the relation between
legal adviser and client."169 The remainder of Wigmore's commentary on this exception indicates a concern over how to define

162 4 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2304.
163 4 id. at 587.
164 Id.
165 See supra text accompanying note 28 (introduction and first phrase of the United
Shoe standard).
166 See supra text accompanying note 28 (requirement of section (d) of the third
phrase of the United Shoe standard).
167 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2298.
168 8 id. at 572.
169 8 id.; cf. supra notes 14-18, 98 and accompanying text (relating to the policy behind the attorney-client privileged relationship).
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the boundaries of this limitation.' Perhaps Wigmore's difficulty
in ascertaining the appropriate scope of such an exception to the
privilege was in fact the impetus behind its omission from his
standard. Nevertheless, its explicit addition through the United Shoe
standard did very little to alter the status of the privilege from the
Wigmore standard.
As demonstrated in this comparison of the United Shoe and
Wigmore standards' terminology,'
two of Judge Wyzanski's
phrases appear "contradictory" to the language chosen by Dean
Wigmore. While these United Shoe phrases relate to different requirements of the standard, they in effect bring about only one
possible difference between the United Shoe standard and the
Wigmore standard. Unfortunately, however, this one divergence
from the Wigmore standard has had a drastic and haphazard effect upon the jurisprudence of the attorney-client privilege postUnited Shoe. The United Shoe terminology, specifically in these "contradictory" phrases, selected by Wyzanski left the scope of the
privilege open to ambiguity and possible application in either a
one-directional or bi-directional manner.
By separating the legal advice requirement from the profes72
sional legal adviser requirement in the United Shoe standard,
additional terminology was required to identify the party to whom
the United Shoe requirements in section (2) (a) and (2) (b) "
apply. 74 In addressing this party to the privilege, Judge Wyzanski
chose the wording "(2) the person to whom the communication
was made," which on its surface can be seen to identify the party

170 Wigmore, considering the very fundamentals of the privilege and its presupposition of requiring the attorney to furnish legal advice to not only the worthy client, but
the culpable client as well, posits the question "[h]ow, then, can the privilege continue
to exist at all if any exception is to be made by which the confidences of the guilty are
to be disclosed?" 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 572. Apparently, the scope of this exception to the privilege posed a dilemma to Wigmore and, after further analysis deducing
there must exist such an exception, he still found it "difficult to see how any moral line
can properly be drawn at that crude boundary [of crime and civil fraud.]" 8 id. at 577.
171 As highlighted by the notations [see discussion below] in Part II.C.3(a), the language of sections (2)(a) and (3)(a)-(b) of the United Shoe standard conflict with the
terminology of the Wigmore standard. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
172 Contra supra text accompanying note 103 (the Wigmore standard simultaneously
handles these requirements in its first phrase).
173 United Shoe sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) mandate that this party "(a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication
is acting as a lawyer ....
" See supra text accompanying notes 28 & 151.
174 This party identification terminology is located at the beginning of section (2),
but preceding the start of subsection (a) of that section. Id.
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in communication with the client, or the attorney. However,
Wyzanski's "to whom" terminology connotates a privileged flow only
in the direction "to" the attorney, whereas Wigmore's reference to
the "communications" of the attorney-client relationship indicates
no such directional distinction. While this use of the words "to
whom" in the United Shoe standard contributes to the standard's
ambiguous directionality, Judge Wyzanski's third phrase in the
standard has an even greater impact on that aspect of the
standard's interpretation.
The greatest of these "contradictions" lies at the center of
each standard and, as do many differences in interpretation do,
owes itself to slight yet critical alterations of specific language. 175
Dean Wigmore's second and third phrases read, "(2) the communications relating to that purpose, (3) made in confidence by the
client ..... " In comparison, subsections (a) and (b) of the third
United Shoe phrase read, "(3) the communication relates to a fact
of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without
the presence of strangers . . . ." Once again, some readers of
these two excerpts might consider them identical in nature and
purpose; unfortunately, distinctions in their wording create a disparity regarding the United Shoe standard's application.
Under United Shoes terminology, the confidence of the client
in the attorney-client relationship may no longer be important, an
interpretation directly in conflict with both the Wigmore standard 7 6 and the policy underlying the existence of the privilege.' 77 The United Shoe switch from the Wigmore language of
"made in confidence by the client" to "by his client without the
presence of strangers" causes such a redirection of the standard's
focus. Where under the Wigmore standard the focus was on the
"confidence,"7 " the focus under this interpretation of United Shoe
is on the "communication."
At first, this shift in focus would not seem detrimental to the
bi-directionality of the privilege since under the doctrine of privilege, the communications are in fact what is privileged, and not

175 These differences exist in sections (3)(a)-(b) of the United Shoe standard, as compared to sections (2) and (3) of the Wigmore standard. Compare supra text accompanying
notes 28 & 151 (United Shoe factors) with supra text accompanying notes 103 & 150
(Wigmore factors).
176 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 99, 104 & 109-11.
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he information communicated. 7 9 However, as previously demonstrated,"8 the plural and singular forms of this term--"communications" versus "communication"-can have entirely different
meanings and in turn, they can define entirely different scopes of
the privilege. The plural "communications"-as
used by
Wigmore-can be thought of as a discourse 8 ' and defined by
either an "interchange of thoughts or opinions," 82 "a close of
intimate rapport,"" or "opinions between two or more people." 84 These definitions, like the plural form "communications,"
fit within the policy rationales behind the privileged communications, doctrine," and are therefore privileged. On the other
hand, the singular "communication"-as shortened from its plural
form by Judge Wyzanski in the United Shoe standard-can be
viewed as a mere statement' 85 and interpreted by such definitions
as "the facts or information communicated,"'8 7 or the "act of imparting information.""
It is clear that these interpretations,
which, like their singular counterpart "communication," have a
one-directional flow inherent in their nature, do not correspond
with the rationales behind the privilege. 89 Since these meanings
do not imply a confidential relationship on their own, Wyzanski
was forced to include additional party terminology in the United
Shoe standard, specifically the phrase "of which the attorney was
informed by his client... ;" This addition, necessary to remedy
Judge Wyzanski's use of the singular "communication," first raised
the specter of the one-directional attomey-client privilege where
none had existed previously at common law.' Therefore, this alteration- of the privilege's language by Judge Wyzanski, through his
seemingly innocent switch in terminology from "communications"
to "communication," caused the uncertainty over the privilege's
directionality which exists today.
This re-evaluation of the United Shoe attomey-client privilege

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

See supra Part III.C.
Id.
WmLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 88 (2d ed. 1992).
WEBSTER'S, supra note 66, at 460.
Id.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (6th ed. 1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
BURTON, supra note 181.
WEBsTER's, supra note 66, at 460.
Id.
See supra Parts II.A & III.C.
See supra notes, 109-13 and accompanying text.
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standard, no longer treating the paraphrasing of Judge Wyzanski
as both a beginning and an end to understanding the attorneyclient privilege,'91 demonstrates that this uncertainty need not
exist any longer. Careful examination of Judge Wyzanski's opinion
has revealed that the United Shoe standard was intended to apply
with the same scope as the attorney-client privilege set forth almost fifty years earlier by Dean Wigmore. The United Shoe standard
can only be applied in accordance with its foundation, the
Wigmore standard, through a bi-directional application, an approach inherent in the Wyzanski terminology itself.192 A bi-directional application, consistent with the policy supporting the attorney-client privilege193 and providing harmony among the circuits,"' would fully protect the attorney-client communicative relationship. It is only through this bi-directional protection that the
privilege can successfully promote full and frank dialogue between
attorneys and clients.'95
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE AMERICAN STANDARD DECISION
In the United States, patents are regulated on the federal
level through the PTO, a branch of the Department of Commerce. While originally granted under state patent laws, state regulation soon ceased with the adoption of the Federal Constitution
and the Patent Act of 1790.196 The Patent and Copyright Clause

of the Constitution provides Congress with the power "to promote
the Progress of the Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries ....
Although the Constitution and the first Patent Act provided the authority for the federal government to regulate patents, the patent system in its cur-

191 The neutralization of the effects of this costly paraphrasing by Judge Wyzanski,
albeit principally the mere removal of the letter "s" from the word communications, will
require extensive judicial analysis along the line of this Note. This is due to the amount
of time courts have had to apply the United Shoe standard in various ways. Nevertheless,
this substantial undertaking follows from the belief of Jeremy Bentham that "error is
never so difficult to be destroyed as when it has its root in language." JESSE DUKEMINIER
& STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 33 (quoting Bentham with regard
to the problems of linguistic inaccuracy).
192 See supra Part IV.B.
193 See supra Part II.A.
194 Compare note 23 with note 30.
195 See supra note 17.
196 See generally CHOATE ET AL., supra note 43, at 68-77.
197 U.S. CoNST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.

1994]

NOTE-PRIVILEGED ADVICE IN PATENT LITIGATION

-1239

rent form did not take shape until the passage of the Patent Act
of 1836.198
A. The Relationship of the Federal Circuit to Patent Law
District courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
all patent actions, excluding actions brought against the United
,States.'9 Prior to 1982, appeals from such patent actions were
heard much like any other appeal, by the appropriate circuit court
of appeals depending upon the geographic region of the lower
district court.2 In 1982, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with a jurisdiction uniquely defined
by subject matter rather than geography, was made the thirteenth
judicial circuit court of appeal. 21 This court was created under
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982202 in order to "provide[] a new forum for the definitive adjudication of selected
categories of cases .
,-203 in which the existing "appellate
courts [had] reach[ed] inconsistent decisions on the same issue,
or in which-although the rule of law may [have] be[en] fairly
clear-courts [had] appl[ied] the law unevenly .... ," 2" The diverse, yet specifically subject-oriented, jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") developed out of this
need for doctrinal stability in certain fields of law: trademark deci-

198 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 1
(1988)). This Act removed many early burdens from federal patent procedure, as well as
curtailed the extent to which fraud permeated the system.
199 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (West Supp. 1993) (Vesting
the United States Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress).
200 One special appellate court did exist prior to 1982 for the purpose of dealing
with some patent issues. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), aside from
having jurisdiction over all final judgments of the United States Custom Court (28 U.S.C.
§ 1541 (repealed 1982)), had jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the Patent Office. Opinions of the CCPA were reviewable by the Supreme Court under normal writ of
certiorari principles. 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (repealed 1982). The CCPA is considered the predecessor to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Ciicuit, albeit with different jurisdiction. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT viii (1988).
201 The creation of the Federal Circuit was brought about through the consolidation
of the CCPA and the former Court of Claims.
202 Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 1295 (1988)).
203 S. REP. NO. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 11,
13.
204 Id.
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technology transfer regulaand labor disputes, 2° and
most substantially, patent law.210 In addition, the GAFC's patent
decisions are particularly powerful as the Supreme Court,. due to
its 6wn docket problems and lack of expertise in the field, rarely
reviews patent law decisions.2 ' The CAFC is therefore usually a
"court of last resort" for patent appeals.
While the court is charged with "a duty of increasing doctrinal stability in the field of patent law[,]"" a conflict develops
when the CAFC is confronted with a procedural issue. 3 Due to
its subject matter jurisdiction, the CAFC has decided it must follow
the "law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals
from the district court would normally lie"2 14 on all non-patent
issues, over which it is not bestowed with the task of eliminating
uncertainty and conflicts. In relation to the confusing application
of the attorney-client privilege to patent law, this decision results
in an interesting question: Does the current status of the attorneyclient privilege in patent law situations affect the doctrinal stability
of patent law greatly enough to merit action by the CAFC on this
procedural doctrine? 215 An examination of the GAFC's most retions,

2°

1

government

contract

205 The CAFC hears appeals from the trademark decisions of the PTO. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(4)(b) (1988).
However, this jurisdiction does not include trademark infringement cases.
206 The CAFC hears appeals from the Court of International Trade and reviews certain final decisions of the International Trade Commission. Id. § 1295(a)(5)-(6).
207 The CAFC reviews findings of law by the Secretary of Commerce relating to importation of instruments or apparatus. Id. § 1295(a)(7).
208 See id. § 1295(a)(2),(3) & (10).
209 See id. § 1295(a)(9) (appeals from the Merit System Protection Board).
210 See id. § 1295(a)(1) (granting CAFC exclusive jurisdiction "of an appeal from a
final decision of [the] district court[s] . . .if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in
whole or in part, on [28 U.S.C.] section 1338[,]" which encompasses civil actions arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents and other intellectual' property). Due to
the fact that patent law uniformity was at the heart of the creation of the Federal Circuit, a clear majority of cases heard by the CAFC fall within this area of its jurisdiction.
211 The Supreme Court also rarely reviewed patent law cases of the individual circuits
prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, which in part led to the CAFC's creation.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6 (1989).
212 Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 333 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
213 This conflict stems from the fact that under Congress' jurisdictional grant to the
CAFC, practitioners and district courts would be accountable to two different courts of
appeal if the CAFC was to develop its own non-patent substantive law. See Panduit Corp.
v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1572-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
214 Id. at 1575.
215 For the answer to this question see infra note 257 & accompanying text.
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cent decision sheds some light on this issue.
B. The American Standard Decision
Five years after the court's creation, the CAFC had to
determine the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to patent validity and invalidity opinions." 6 In American Standard, Inc. v.
Pfizer Inc.,21 the Federal Circuit was presented with an order
from the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The
order held that since "the opinion letter relie[d] on non-confidential information gleaned-from public records.., there [was] no
privilege in the document."1 8 In reviewing this order, the CAFC
steered clear of the pitfall which snared the district court; yet at
the same time, the CAFC missed an opportunity to finally put to
rest the directionality aspect of the attorney-client privilege.
The Federal Circuit recognized, unlike the district court, that
the attomey-client'privilege was designed to protect the communications between the attorney and client, and not the information
underlying such communications. 9 However, shifting the focus
of its examination from the information to the 'communications,
the CAFC was confronted with a procedural decision, specifically
whether or not the privilege was bi-directional. Following its policy

216 A patent validity opinion is a communication from a patent attorney to his client
reflecting the patent attorney's opinion, based upon the prior art and all available literature in the field, as to whether a patent which has been obtained for an invention is
valid. Conversely, an invalidity opinion expresses the patent attorney's opinion that based
up6n his research, a patent is invalid.
In a typical example, a manufacturer seeks an opinion prior to making a product
or in order to specifically design a product so that it does not infringe a similar patented product. Without having received an opinion finding manufacture of the product not
to be infringement, a manufacturer can be guilty of willful infringement.
The issue of privilege with regard to these opinions is important in nearly every
patent litigation. Usually, the holder of the patent charges willful infringement and the
defendant responds by claiming it possesses an invalidity opinion on that patent. In Ameriran Standard, this opinion was shared with the patentee and then, interestingly, the patentee claimed that this opinion was privileged under the defendant's attorney-client privilege. The patentee argued for the privilege to apply in the hope that other related documents would then become available under the waiver doctrine. American Standard, Inc.
v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 738 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see supra note 104 (fifth Wigmore
phrase). See generally ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT PATENT LAW' AND PRACTICE § 3.05 (4th ed. 1984).
217 828 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
218 American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., No. S. 86-216 (N.D. Ind. July 8, 1986),
quoted in American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 744 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
219 Id. at 745 ("[The attorney-client privilege] protects communications made in confidence . . . ."). See also supra Part III.C.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:5

of ruling on procedural issues in accordance with the law of the
regional circuit,220 the CAFC looked to the Seventh Circuit for
guidance in making its decision.22
Discovering that "[t] he courts have not been clear and of one
mind in applying the privilege to communications from attorney
to client,"222 the court found that Seventh Circuit precedent was
2 2 of applicability. With the Sevlimited to "general principles""
enth Circuit Court of Appeals undecided on the issue, the Federal
Circuit looked to a decision from the Northern District of Illinois,
Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan, 24 to ascertain the
Seventh Circuit position on this issue. The Ohio-Sealy court, basing
its interpretation on non-Seventh Circuit opinions, granted the
privilege to "statements from an attorney to his client only if convinced that the statements in fact do reveal, directly or indirectly,
2
the substance of a confidential communication by the client."

1

With no additional discussion of the Ohio-Sealy approach, the
CAFC adopted this as the view of the Seventh Circuit and thereby
affirmed the district court's attorney-client privilege order, stating:
"We agree with [the Ohio-Sealy] interpretation, and, because there
is no such revelation in the opinion letter at hand, we cannot view
as clearly erroneous the district court's finding that it was not
privileged."

226

It was with this decision, or more aptly stated, with this lack
of a decision, that the Federal Circuit failed to satisfy their fundamental mandate. In affirming the district court's finding of no
privilege, albeit on different grounds, the Federal Circuit made
two mistakes. First, if the court felt compelled to allow the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois to speak for the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals with its opinion in Ohio-Sealy, the CAFC
should have concerned itself with the accuracy and merit of that
decision. Secondly, in passing up an extremely rare opportunity to

220
221
222
223
1980)).
224
225
226

See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
American Standard, 828 F.2d at 745.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 28 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
90 F.R.D. 21 (N.D. Ill.
Id. at 28 (citing Matter of Fischel, 551 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977)).
American Standard, 828 F.2d at 745.
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clarify this issue, = the CAFC failed to fulfill its mandate of clarifying and stabilizing patent law.
1.

American Standard The Adoption of the Ohio-Sealy
Misinterpretation

Upon ascertaining that the Seventh Circuit had not specifically discussed the application of the privilege to communications
from attorney to client, the CAFC appropriately looked to the
district courts of that circuit for insight into how the Court of
Appeals would decide the issue.22 The CAFC, however, failed to
realize that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, had this issue
been before them, would have scrutinized the Ohio-Sealy view prior
to adopting it as the proper interpretation for that circuit.
In adopting Ohio-Sealy as the proper interpretation of attorneyclient privilege directionality in the Seventh Circuit, the CAFC
found that it could not "view as clearly erroneous the district
court's finding that [the opinion letter] was not privileged."'
According to the CAFC's interpretation of the Seventh Circuit's
standard of review, an abuse-of-discretion standard applied to its
review of the district court's order.' "Under [this] standard, an
abuse of discretion occurs when . . .the decision is based on an
erroneous conclusion of law.... "
Thus, had an erroneous
conclusion of law been found by the CAFC in American Standard,
the privilege ruling could have been reversed. Therefore, if OhioSealy, the linchpin of American Standards directionality analysis, had
been founded upon an incorrect conclusion of law, a different
outcome should have resulted. Unfortunately for those seeking
greater stability in patent law through the Federal Circuit's opinions, the CAFC did not examine Ohio-Sealy for an error of law.
The merit of the Ohio-Sealy decision -depends on its purported

227 "[S]ince discovery orders are ordinarily not final, and therefore not appealable,
rulings on privilege rarely reach the appellate level." Robert L. Baechtold, The Federal
Circuit's View on Attorney-Client Prilege, Work Product and Related Items, 29 J.L. & TEcH. 233,

238 (1989). The American Standard privilege question reached the appellate level due to
the fact that discovery was sought outside of the trial forum. See American Standard, 828
F.2d at 737.
228
229

American Standard, 828 F.2d at 745.
Id.

230 Id. at 739 (citing Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
231

Id.
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foundation, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n. 2 In Radiant Burners, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Wigmore standard of
the attorney-client privilege.233 Radiant Burners first discussed the
policy behind having such a privilege, 2" and then accepted the
Wigmore standard as the governing standard in the Seventh Circuit. It quoted verbatim from Wigmore's treatise Evidence in Trials
at Common Law."s Radiant Burners adopted the entire Wigmore
standard as the proper application of the attorney-client privilege,
including its inherent bi-directionality.B
Nevertheless, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois diverged from this standard in Ohio-Sealy. Announcing that
the Seventh Circuit had adopted the Wigmore standard in Radiant
Burners, the Ohio-Sealy court then proceeded to misquote both the
original Wigmore phrasing as well as the Radiant Burners lan-'
guage." The court defined a portion of the standard under the
Ohio-Sealy test: "(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected .. . "2 But this portion of the Radiant
Burners opinion actually reads, "(3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected . . . .
Under this Note's five-factor Wigmore analysis, 2" the OhioSealy discrepancy results in an entirely different third factor. Under
the Wigmore/Radiant Burners standard, this factor reads, "made in
confidence by the client," whereas under the erroneous Ohio-Sealy
standard, this factor reads "made in confidence, by the client."2 4'
The addition of the comma in Ohio-Sealy makes this third factor

232 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
233 See supra note 23.
234 Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d at 318-19.
235 Id. at 319 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2292). The quote in Radiant Burners is identical to Wigmore's standard as put forth in his treatise. See also supra text accompanying note 22.
236 See supra Part IV.A.
237 Compare Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 28 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
with 4 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2292 and Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d at 319.
238 Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at 28.
239 Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d at 319 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2292).
240 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
241 In actuality, if the Ohio-Sealy standard was the true text of the Wigmore standard,
this Note would have broken the Wigmore standard down into six factors as opposed to
five. Contra supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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two-pronged, 24 2 and therefore limits the attorney-client privilege's
protection to only the statements from the client to the attorney. 24 Accordingly, the sentence immediately following this erroneous depiction of the Wigmore standard states, "It]his formulation presupposes that communications for which privilege is
claimed will emanate directly from the client."2' Such a presupposition of one-directionality, while supported by the incorrect
Ohio-Sealy version of the Wigmore standard, has no foundation in
valid Seventh Circuit precedent. Conversely, from its adoption in
Radiant Burners, the Seventh Circuit has accepted a.bi-directional
application of the attorney-client privilege as correct,2' in accordance with the policy and history of the privilege.2 "
Therefore, when the Ohio-Sealy court held that "the [one-directional] approach best comport[ed] with the general principles
governing ttorney-client privilege as enunciated in this Circuit[,]"247 it disregarded the specific text, phrasing, and principles of the standard adopted by the.Seventh Circuit.2 4 Had the
CAFC noticed it, this misapplication of the law in Ohio-Sealy would
have altered the court's analysis of Seventh Circuit precedent,
leading to a reversal of the district court below and providing the
Federal Circuit with the motivation to re-evaluate and clarify the
status of the privilege as well.
2.

American Standard: A Procedurally Non-Activist Federal Circuit

To many spectators of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence, the
decision in American Standard was a cruel flashback to the state of
the law which brought about the creation of the CAFC.249 In her
strong dissenting opinion, Judge Newman went so far as to say
that, "[t]his ruling negates decades of hard won precedent, and is

242 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the two-pronged result of
this comma, due to its making the phrase "made in confidence" into a grammatical appositive).
243 This linguistic argument was put forth in detail supra Part IVA.
244 Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 28 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
245 See supra Part IVA. (demonstrating the inherent bi-directionality of the Wigmore
standard).
246 See supra Part IIA

247 Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at 28.
248 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1963).
249 S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CA.N. 11,
15 ("The great weight of the testimony .. . confirmed the findings of the Hrska commission that patent cases are inconsistently adjudicated."). See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
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a giant step backward into uncertainty, confusion, and prejudice.""' While Judge Newman's interpretation of the majority
opinion may have been somewhat harsh, her concern was not
unwarranted: the position taken by the majority in American Standard avails itself to an argument in favor of not applying the attorney-client privilege to any patent validity or invalidity opinion."
The main reason for the divergent readings of the American
Standard decision-ranging from a mere denial of the privilege in
a unique fact situation 2 to a general negation of the privilege's
protection of patent validity opinionsM---was the court's attempt
to resolve this case independently, without actively considering its
potential contributions to the development of patent law. The majority did this in American Standard by appending the following
caveats to its holding:
We do not here hold that no patent-validity opinions are ever
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Nor do we hold that
patent-validity opinions based on publicly available information
(as most such opinions are) are for that reason alone outside
the attorney-client privilege. Nor do we hold that what the
attorney told the client in an opinion letter is always irrelevant.
We merely hold that, under the facts of this case, the district
court did not err in determining that the opinion letter here
at issue did not reveal confidential communications and therefore was not privileged. . .. '
These caveats, while slightly confusing, were -necessary to allay
the fears brought about by the court's distinction that "[the district court] did not say the opinion letter was not privileged merely because it relied on publicly available information. It clearly said
the letter relied on nonconfidential information gleaned from
public records. " " It is difficult to imagine that a court which
could proffer such a minuscule and confusing distinction was
content with the current status of the privilege, in light of its mandate to increase doctrinal stability in patent law. Yet, amidst this
confusion, the Federal Circuit declined the opportunity in American Standard to even attempt to clarify the attorney-client

250 American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
251 ARNOLD, WHrrE & DURKEE, 1988-1989 PATENT LAW HANDBOOK 187 (1988).
252 Id.
253 American Standard, 828 F.2d 748 (Newman, J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 746 (footnote omitted).
255 Id.
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privilege's relationship to patent law.2s
Returning to our previous question of whether the CAFC felt
that the status of the attorney-client privilege affected the stability
of patent law greatly enough to merit action on this. procedural
doctrine, it appears from the holding in American Standard that the
Federal Circuit has answered this question in the negative.'s 7
VI.

UNMNG THE HANDS OF THE FEDER.AL CIRCUIT

From its decision in American Standard, it becomes clear that
the hands of the CAFC are tied with regard to solving procedural
problems which happen to be exaggerated in patent cases,M so
long as the CAFC remains a non-activist court merely analyzing
the current interpretations of the federal attorney-client privilege
standards. To a Federal Circuit intent on fulfilling its mandate of
"increasing doctrinal stability in patent law," 9 .however, these restraints are easily broken. Examination of the self-imposed procedural limitation upon the CAFC reveals that it can be circumvented should the situation merit such treatment.
In Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Manufacturing Co.,2' the
CAFC decided that it should follow "the law of the particular
regional circuit court where appeals from the District Court would
normally lie"26 on all non-patent issues. The CAFC reached this
decision by balancing the Federal Circuit's mandate 26 2 with the
court's concern over district courts being accountable to the procedural rules of two different courts of appeals." 3 While it seems
from the Panduit decision that the CAFC wishes to impose a precise distinction between "substance" and "procedure," it has never
offered an explanation solidifying this distinction.Y In addition,

256 Another commentator has suggested that the Federal Circuit has disregarded the
attorney-client privilege in other decisions as well. See Nelson, supra note 15, at 415 ("The
Federal Circuit neglected to address or even acknowledge the privilege. The privilege has
existed too long and is too widely accepted for this type of cursory treatment.").
257 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
258 This is due to the CAFC's decision in Panduit to defer to regional law on procedural issues. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.

259
260
261

Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 333 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1575.

262
263
264

See supra text accompanying note 259.
See supra note 213.
In the Panduit decision, the court cited to Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,

14 (1941), regarding the "substance"/"procedure" distinction. The Sibbach opinion, a companion to decisions such as Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), in the development
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the Federal Circuit has not clarified which procedural matters are
so "unique to patent issues "2" that they merit exemption from
its Panduitlimitation on procedural rulings.2"
The Supreme Court provides limited guidance on the issue.
In fact, the seminal Supreme Court case on the distinction between "substance" and "procedure," in the context of the Erie doctrine,267 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc.,2" provides as much confusion as it does valuable guidance.2"
Simply put, distinctions between "substance" and "procedure"
are "inherently ephemeral and thus difficult to draw."27 This underlying fact explains the lack of clear guidance available, because
no set criteria can precisely distinguish these two overlapping con27
cepts. 1
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,272 Justice Frankfurter exposed
the inadequacy of a distinction between "substance" and "procedure" when he said:
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much.
talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course,
"substance" and "procedure" are the same keywords to very
different problems. Neither "substance" nor "procedure" repre-

of the Erie doctrine, depended heavily upon legislative characterizations under the authority of the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988); see Dreyfuss, supra note 211, at
39-40; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3, at 268 (1989).
265 Panduit 744 F.2d at 1575.
266 Dreyfuss, supra note 211, at 40.
267 The Erie doctrine takes its name from the landmark decision of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie ruled that in diversity cases, federal courts are to apply state law, including state common law. This decision wiped out a hugh body of federal common law which had developed under the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842). The Erie decision greatly resolved the developing problem of forum shopping at the time, but at the same time posed interesting application problems. Relative
to this discussion, the most pertinent of these problems was under what circumstances
may federal courts apply federal procedural law. Later decisions on this issue were forced
to deal with a "substance"/"procedure" distinction similar to the one faced by the CAFC.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 264, § 5.3.5.
268 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
269 Dreyfuss, supra note 211, at 3940 & n.227.
270 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 264, at 266.
271 Lehan Kent Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure"after Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271, 277 (1939) ("many items waver from one category to the other . .. "); JOSEPH STORY, CONFYIcr OF LAWS 1028-29 (4th ed. 1852)
("[W]hen we come to the confines [between substance and procedure], and when one
province runs into the other, there arises the difficulty, and then we get inter apices juris
[i.e. among the subtleties of the law].")
272 326 U.S. 99 (1944).
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sents the same invariants. Each implies different variables dependingupon the particular problem for which it is used.27
Frankfurter's last sentence, that the classification "depend[s] upon
the particular problem for which it is used[,]"' 4 holds the key to
resolving the CAFC's Panduit limitation with regard to attorneyclient privileged legal advice in patent litigation. The Federal Circuit, in light of the particular problems surrounding the application of the attorney-client privilege to patent advice,275 should
hold that in situations involving legal advice from a patent attorney to his client, the issue of the attorney-client privilege is a substantive issue. That would not conflict with the court's Panduit
decision276 because in Panduit the CAFC retained its power to
rule on procedural matters which are "unique to patent
issues."277 Since the uncertain application of the attorney-client
privilege to patent law"8 also runs counter to the CAFC's mandate of increasing doctrinal stability in patent law," the attorneyclient privilege should be a substantive issue for the CAFC to rule
on in accordance with its mandate.
Faced with a substantive decision as to the scope of the attorney-client privilege in patent law, the CAFC should not only look
at the current standards of the privilege in the regional circuits,
but also to the policy supporting the existence of the attorneyclient privilege. From this analysis, the Federal Circuit will discover
that the policy behind the privilege,"' as well as the correct interpretations of both the Wigmore and United Shoe standards,2"
support a bi-directional application of the privilege. Such an application in the field of patent law will eliminate the confusion surrounding this issue. 2 by protecting all legal advice from a patent
attorney to his client.

273 Id. at 108.
274 Id.
275 See supra Part III.
276 See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
277 Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Without further elaboration by the- CAFC, the Panduit decision itself demonstrates the
overlap between "substance" and "procedure". By deeming certain procedural issues
"unique to patent issues" and therefore open to Federal Cir~uit rulings, the CAFC is basically deeming those issues substantive in the field of patent law.

278 See supra Parts III & V.B.
279
280
281
282

See
See
See
See

supra Part V.A.
supra Part HI.A.
supra Part IV.
supra Parts HI. & V.B.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

VII.

[VoI. 69:5

CONCLUSION

The attorney-client privilege exists to promote the full and
open communications between an attorney and client, a goal
which undoubtedly leads to better legal representation.2 3 However, current applications of this privilege in a one-directional manner are eroding the privilege's protection, and in turn, breeding
uncertainty surrounding the attorney-client privilege. This uncertainty undermines the goal of full disclosure in attorney-client
relationships. The expectation of receiving the privilege, not some
later judicial ruling, is what encourages honesty and candor in the
advisory relationship, and that expectation requires certainty in the
law. 84 This uncertainty is exacerbated by the many factors
unique to patent law which confuse the role of the patent attorney.

28 5

28
In accordance with its mandate of clarifying patent law,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should take action
and re-examine the status of the attorney-client privilege in patent
litigation. Carefully considering the policy behind the privilege and
the prevailing regional standards of the attorney-client privilege, 287 the CAFC should adopt a bi-directional application of the
privilege. This would not only increase doctrinal stability in patent
law in accordance with its mandate, but would harmonize the
modern attorney-client privilege with the policy behind its existence. Only through such stability and harmony will the attorneyclient privilege in patent litigation be rescued from eroding to the
point of being "little better than no privilege at all."2"

Gregg F. LoCascio
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See supra Part IIA.
See Thornburg, supra note 73, at 166.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part IV.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1980).

